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NOTES
MILITARY PERSONNEL AND THE FEDERAL TORT
CLAIMS ACT*
JUDIcIAL treatment of the Federal Tort Claims Act of 1946 1 has already
exemplified the reluctance of many courts to accede to the full measure of
Congressional reforms. Frequent reiteration of the much-criticized maxim
that "statutes in derogation of sovereign immunity must be strictly con-
strued" serves to rationalize the courts' refusal to accept Congress' repudia-
tion of immunity at its broad face value.2 This circumscriptive reaction is
*United States v. Brooks (two cases), 169 F2d 340 (4th Cir. 1948), crt. granted,
17 U.S. L. WEan 3197 (U.S. January 3, 1949).
1. 60 STAT. 842 (1946), 28 U.S.C. §§ 921-946 (1946). The newly revised Judicial
Code has redistributed and renumbered the provisions of the Tort Claims Act. It is con-
tained in §§ 1291, 1346(b), 1402, 1504, 2110, 2401, 2402, 2411, 2412, and 2671-26S0 of the
new Code (1948). The revision has effected several changes in the wording of the Act,
but the substance has not been altered. Since previous opinions and literature dealing with
the Act, as well as the instant case, have been directed to the numbering used in the 1946
codification, that version will be cited throughout this Note. For those who wish to refer
to the new Code, a conversion table may be found at p. 2047 of 2 U.S.C. Co:G. SMv.
(1948).
For analysis and historical background of the Tort Claims Act, see Gellhom and
Schenck, Tort Actions Against the Federal Government, 47 COL. L. Rav. 722 (1947) ;
Gottlieb, The Federal Tort Claims Act-A Statutory Interpretation, 35 GEo. UJ. 1
(1946) ; Comment, 56 YALn. L. J. 534 (1947). Cases arising in the first year since the
passage of the Act are reviewed in Hulen, Suits on Tort Claims Against the Unitcd States,
7 F.R.D. 6S9 (1948).
2. R.g., Bewick v. United States, 74 F. Supp. 730 (N.D. Tex. 1947) (subrogees
have no standing to sue under Tort Claims Act) ; Long v. United States, 78 F.Supp. 35,
37 (S.D. Cal. 1948) ("scope of employment" narrowly construed to bar claim based on
negligence of federal civilian employee who deviated from prescribed driving route);
Spelar v. United States, 75 F.Supp. 967, 968 (E.D. N.Y. 1948) (airfield leased to United
States in Newfoundland for 99 years is "foreign country" within the exclusion of the
Tort Claims Act, notwithstanding previous rulings that the same area is a "territory or
possession" of United States within coverage of the Fair Labor Standards Act), rcv'd
171 F.2d 208 (2d Cir. 1948). With the strictness of these holdings, contrast Chief Judge
Cardozo's oft-quoted comment: "The exemption of the sovereign from suit involves hard-
ship enough where consent has been withheld. We are not to add to its rigor by refine-
ments of construction where consent has been announced." Anderson v. John L Hayes
Construction Co., 243 N.Y. 140, 147, 153 N.E. 28, 29-30 (1926). This more liberal ap-
proach has been evidenced by such decisions as Old Colony Insurance Co. ,. United
States, 168 F2d 931 (6th Cir. 1948) (subrogees are included within coverage of Tort
Claims Act) ; and Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. United States, 170 F-2d 469 (2d Cir.
1948) (subrogees may sue under Tort Claims Act). See Wallace v. United States, 142
F2d 240, 243 (2d Cir. 1944) ; Hammond-Knowlton v. United States, 121 F.2d 191 203
(2d Cir. 1941).
For a persuasive argument that the doctrine of sovereign immunity should never have
been adopted by American courts in the Arst place, see Borchard, Go'enmcntal Rcsponsi-
bility in Tort, 36 YAxa L. J. 1, 757, 1039 (1926). The gist of Professor Borchard's thesis
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illustrated by the recent decision of the Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit in United States v. Brooks,3 a case involving the rights of military
personnel under the Act.
Two American soldiers-both on furlough, driving in their own automo-
bile, and not engaged in any military business-were struck by an Army
truck, negligently operated by a civilian employee of the War Department.
One of the soldiers was killed, while his brother and father were both in.
jured. The survivors obtained judgments against the United States for
these injuries and for the wrongful death of the deceased soldier.4 On ap-
peal, the judgments as to the two soldiers were reversed by the Fourth Cir-
cuit, with Chief Judge Parker dissenting, on the ground that all members
of the Armed Forces are by implication excluded from the coverage of the
Tort Claims Act. Though no other appellate courts have considered this
question, two district courts in other circuits have reached an opposite con-
clusion in similar cases,' and the Brooks case is now before the Supreme
Court.
6
The Circuit Court readily conceded that a literal reading of the Act gave
no indication that Congress intended to exclude servicemen. The Govern-
ment's liability for negligence of its employees and agents is expressly ex-
is that sovereign immunity is inconsistent with the founding principle of the United States
-that the King not only could, but did, do wrong. And see, e.g., Mr. Justice Wilson,
concurring in Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 DalI. 419, 453 (U.S.1793). But sed The Siren, 7
Wall. 152, 153-4 (U.S. 1868).
3. 169 F.2d 840 (4th Cir. 1948), cert. granted, 17 U.S. L. WFr, 3197 (U.S. January
3, 1949).
4. Brooks v. United States, Civ. Nos. 545, 546, 547 (WD. N.C. 1947) (opinion re-
printed in Appendix B of Brief for United States, on appeal to U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Fourth Circuit). The judgments awarded were: $5,000 to the father, for Injuries;
$4,000 to the injured soldier; and $25,425 to the father as administrator of the estate of
the deceased soldier ($25,000 for wrongful death, and $425 for damages to the soldier's
automobile).
5. Alansky v. Northwest Airlines, 77 F. Supp, 556 (D.Mont. 1948) (action against
United States and against Northwest Airlines for death of Army officer killed in crash
of Government-operated airplane) ; Samson v. United States, 79 F.Supp. 406 (S.D. N.Y.
1947) (action for death of soldier in a negligently operated Army bus). Trials in both
cases have been postponed pending final appellate ruling on the Brooks case. The Samson
ruling has recently been counterbalanced by the dismissal of a similar action by Judge Rif-
kind in the same district. Ostrander v. United States, Civ. No. 43-131 (S,D,N.Y. 1949)
(action for death of soldier from negligence of Army doctors).
Another case posing substantially the same question is Jefferson v. United Stateg, 74
F.Supp. 209 (D.Md. 1947), noted in 61 HAv. L. Rsv. 550 (1948), 34 VA. L. Rav. 360
(1948), where a soldier sued the United States for the negligence of an Army surgeon
in performing an operation for a non-combat-incurred illness. The Government's motion
to dismiss was denied "without prejudice." At the end of trial, however, Judge Chesnut
reconsidered the motion and ruled that the soldier had no standing to sue under the Tort
Claims Act. 77 F. Supp. 706 (1948). This latter opinion was persuasive to the majority
in the Brooks case. The Fourth Circuit, however, has deferred decision on Jefferson's
appeal pending the ruling of the Supreme Court on its Brooks holding.
6. Certiorari was granted on January 3, 1949. 17 U.S. L. WE= 3197.
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tended "... to the same claimants, in the same manner, and to the same
extent as a private individual under like circumstances." 7 Twelve excep-
tions are enumerated; 8 the only one pertaining to military personnel is that
which bars all claims "arising out of the combatant activities of the military
or naval forces, or the Coast Guard, during time of war." 0 None of the
exceptions applies to the instant case. But the court, on the theory that
the literal reading may be broader than the intended meaning, disregarded
the familiar rule of construction that expressio unius est exdusio alferills, and
read an additional exception into the Act through a questionable inter-
pretation of the intent of its framers.
The Tort Claims Act was enacted as an integral part of the Legislative
Reorganization Act of 1946.11 As such, it has a double-barreled purpose: to
remove the previous barrier to suits against the Government in tort, and,
by so doing, to relieve Congress of the burden of handlingthe thousands of
private bills for relief that were, in the absence of any other remedy, sub-
7. 23 U.S.C. § 931(a) (1946).
S. 28 U.S.C. § 943 (1946). The twelve exceptions fall generally into two distinct
categories: first, claims arising out of those activities in which the Government should
not, for various reasons, be held to any tort liability (execution of laws or of executive
discretion; transmission of mail; revenue collection; administering of the Trading With
The Enemy Act; establishment of quarantine; monetary operations by the Treasury;
combatant activities in time of war; and willful torts by Government agents, such as as-
sault, false arrest, libel, misrepresentation, etc.) ; and second, those activities where suffi.
dent remedies for injury or death are already provided under other legislation (suits in
admiralty; ship accidents in the Panama Canal; claims arising in foreign countries; and
claims arising out of the activities of the Tennessee Valley Authority). Servicemen's
claims might have been included under either of these two categories of exceptions, but
Congress failed to do so. That Congress was aware of the legal problems posed by the
Armed Forces is clearly indicated, however, by the fact that the Act expressly includes
military and naval personnel as "employees" for whose negligent acts or omissions the
Government will be liable. 28 U.S.C. § 921(b) (1946).
Apropos of the second category of exceptions, it should be noted that a thirteenth
exception, excluding "all claims for which compensation is provided by the Federal Em-
ployees' Compensation Act, as amended, and the World War Veterans Act of 1924, as
amended" w~as included in earlier drafts of the Tort Claims bill in the House, -L.R 7236,
76th Cong., 1st Sess. (1939), and H.R. 131, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. (1946). But this ex-
ception was dropped, without explanation, from the final version of the Act. From theze
circumstances, it might be inferred that servicemen's claims, though partially comp esated
by other laws, are not excluded from the purview of the Tort Claims Act. This argument
was urged in the dissenting opinion, 169 F.2d 840, 849 (4th Cir. 1948).
9. 28 U.S.C. §943(j) (1946). This section as originally drawn excluded any claim
arising out of "... activities . . ." of the military or naval forces or Coast Guard during
time of war. The "combatant" qualification was inserted, without recorded explanation,
by the House during the final passage of the bill in 1946. See 92 Coz.. Rr-c. 10139, 1015
(1946).
Barring "combatant" claims gives rise to no inference as to the permissibility of other
soldiers' claims, since the exception concerns the circumstances under which the injury
occurs, rather than the status of the injured party. The exception applies to claims of
soldiers and civilians alike; see note 51 infra.
10. 60 STAT. 812, 842 (1946). 28 U.S.C. §921-46 (1946).
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mitted to it each year." The court asserted that before the Act's passage
private laws were frequently sought by civilians, but almost never by
servicemen, 12 and inferred from this state of affairs a Congressional intent
to withhold from servicemen the remedies of the Tort Claims Act.
But the court in so reasoning seems to have overlooked the other facet
of the new law-its sweeping waiver of immunity to actions in tort. Though
cognate to the object of abolishing private bills, the waiver of sovereign
immunity also has independent significance.13 The Act expressly grounds
the Government's liability in the tort law of the several states.1 4 It affords
no basis for assuming that recovery is or should be limited to those claims
which in practice were passed upon by the Claims Committees of the Senate
and House."5
Lacking the guidance of any explicit statements of Congressional intent
relevant to this problem, 6 the court also relied heavily on the existence of
11. See SEN. REP. No. 1400, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. (1946); H.R.Rn-..No. 1287, 79th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1946). For discussion of the nature and the faults of the "private bill"
remedy, see Note, 50 YAE L.J. 328(1940).
12. Actually, there is no available compilation of data as to the classes of people who
submitted private bills to Congress. But the Statutes at Large disclose several instances
of private laws awarding to survivors of deceased military personnel a sum equal to the
decedent's pay for six months. E.g., 47 STAT. 1686 (1932) ; 47 STAT. 1701 (1932). Most of
these laws seem to have been awarded in lieu of statutory pensions, from which the 'sur-
vivors were for some reason disqualified. These six-months-pay awards are now institu-
tionalized as a regular statutory gratuity. 41 STAT. 367 (1919), as amended, 10 U.S.C.
§ 903 (1946). Another type of private law-e.g., 55 STAT. 902 (1941)-compensates mill-
tary personnel for property losses in service, supplementing a general policy which dates
from the Act of March 3, 1885, 23 STAT. 350, replaced by the Military Personnel Claims
Act of 1945, 59 STAT. 225 (1945), 31 U.S.C. §222(c) (1946), U.S. WA DEP., AR 25-
100 (1945). Apart from these laws, however, the Statutes at Large disclose no other
private bills successfully brought by or in behalf of servicemen.
13. Professor Borchard has characterized this aspect of the Tort Claims Act as ".
a revolution in legal principles." Government Liability in Tort, 26 CAN. B. Rrv. 399
(1948).
14. 28 U.S.C. § 931(a) (1946). This provision in effect incorporates the Eric-Tomp'
kins doctrine into the Act.
15. It seems clear that the coverage of the Act was not intended to correlate precisely
with the jurisdiction formerly exercised by the Claims Committees. There was no theoreti-
cal limitation on the types of claims which could be submitted to Congress, but the pro-
cedure often consumed large amounts of the claimant's time and money, and thus many
valid claims were either not brought or else never reached final approval, See Note, 50
YALE L.J. 328 (1940). The decentralized adjudication provided by the Tort Claims Act
now makes it practicable to prosecute many claims which in the past were left to die
merely because of the difficulty of pursuing a private bill to a successful passage. Con-
versely, many private laws compensated claims involving no "fault" on the part of the
Government; see, e.g., 50 STAT. 1081 (1937) ("An Act to provide for the reimbursement
of certain enlisted men . . . of the Navy for the value of personal effects lost . . . during
the hurricane in Samoa on January 15, 1931."). Such claims would not be cognizable
under the Tort Claims Act, and the private law is still the only means of recovery.
16. Most of the legislative opinion and debate on the Act is recorded in H.R.REP.No,
1287, 79th Cong., 1st Sess.(1946); Sx. REP. No. 1400, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. (1946);
[Vol. 58
NOTES
the various servicemen's welfare laws, such as those providing for disability
and medical benefits, survivors' pensions, life insurance, and education
subsidies.lr From the generous and comprehensive nature of these laws,
the court concluded that Congress did not intend to confer an additional,
and in some respects overlapping, benefit on servicemen. 13
This reliance on the alternate coverage of soldiers' benefits suggests a
partial analogy to workmen's compensation statutes, where-on a somewhat
dubious "bargain" theory 1 9-- the assured minimum of compensation was
made available in return for abandonment by the workmen of the more
lucrative but less certain tort action against the employer. It might be
argued that a similar "bargain" may be inferred with respect to soldiers'
compensation, and that all soldiers therefore lack standing to sue the Gov-
ernment which protects them. The unrelated histories of soldiers' benefits
and the Tort Claims Act, however, seem to detract from the validity of the
"bargain" rationale. O Unlike workmen's compensation, soldiers' benefits
and 86 CONG. Rnc. 12015-32 (1940). None of these includes any discussion of the instant
problem.
17. The laws pertaining to welfare and compensation of servicemen and veterans are
too numerous to be cited individually. Most of them are contained in Titles 10, 33, and
50 (Appendix) of the United States Code. An encyclopedic treatment of these laws is
provided by KIMROUGH AND GLEN, AERmmCAN LA w oF ,r ns (1946).
18. The court relied heavily upon the decisions in Dobson v. United States, 27 F.2d
807 (2d Cir. 1928), cert. denied, 278 U.S. 653 (1929), and Bradey v. United States, 151
F.2d 742 (2d Cir. 1945), cert. dendcd, 326 U.S. 795 (1946). The survivors of Dobson and
Bradey, Navy personnel who died in collision or sinking of the ships on which they served,
brought suit for the wrongful deaths under the Public Vessels Act of 1925, 43 STAr. 1112
(1925), 46 U.S.C. § 781 et seq. (1925), alleging negligent construction and operation of
the ships. In both cases, however, the court barred the actions on the ground that the
relief already provided by the pension acts of Congress was the enscluive remedy for
injury or death of naval personnel.
It should be noted that the waiver of immunity afforded by the Public Vessels Act
("A libel in personam in admiralty may be brought against the United States ... for
damages caused by a public vessel of the United States.... " 46 U.S.C. § 781 (1925), is
much more limited than the liability now announced in the Tort Claims Act for '... any
claim. . . in the same manner, and to the same extent as a private individual under like
circumstances." 28 U.S.C. § 931(a) (1946). It seems not unreasonable to suppose that a
less strict result might have been reached if the Public Vessels Act had provided as e.x-
tensive and sweeping a waiver of immunity as is now contained in the Tort Claims Act.
19. "It was part of the original bargain, giving rise to this legislation, that, if the
employer should be made liable without fault, he should also be given an immunity from
the hazards of a common-law suit." STmrr, CAsEs o~T THn LAW oF Aon.icv 192 (1933).
Quite apart from any discussion of the relative merits of tort actions and compenwation,
the "bargain" aspect of the trade seems questionable, especially since it applied ako to
the minority of workers who preferred not to yield their rights in tort in return for the
lower scale of compensation.
20. A detailed historical review of pension laws and veterans legislation is contained
in I-R. Doc.No. 136, 79th Cong., 1st Sess.(1946). For background of the Tort Claims
Act, see articles by Gottlieb, Gellhorn and Schenck, supra note 1.
19491
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are essentially acts of sovereign grace, 21 and are not expressly designated
as exclusive remedies., The financial extent of their coverage,22 though often
substantially equivalent to that of a tort recovery, may sometimes fall far
short of the measure of damages to which any non-military claimant would
be entitled, particularly in actions for wrongful death; if benefits were in-
tended as a universal substitute for tort recoveries by soldiers, expansion
and equalization are in order. 23 Moreover, similar benefits have been con-
ferred upon civilian employees of the Government under the Federal Em-
ployees' Compensation Act 24 and other statutes, but the mere availabilily
of such compensation does not bar a tort action by those employees against
the United States for the negligence of other Government agents.25
In retrospect, the court's interpretation of Congressional intent seems
mistaken. Representative Emmanuel Celler, who drafted the Tort Claims
Act and nursed it through three sessions of Committee and House debate
to final passage, stated unequivocally when he learned of the court's deci-
sion that these other laws are quite unrelated to the remedy afforded by
21. See KIMROUGH AND GLRN, AMERICAN LAW OF VTrzRANS § 647 (1946). And
see, e.g., Donnelly v. United States, 17 Ct. Cl. 105, 108 (1881).
22. A statistical compilation of the current scale of disability compensation and pen-
sion payments is contained in H.R. COMM. PRINT No. 380, Compensation or Pension to
Veterans or their Dependents: Analysis of Elements of Entitlement to and Rates of Co in
pensation or Pension, 80th Cong., 2d Sess.(1948). Disability payments run from a minl-
mum of $13.80 monthly for 10 percent disability to $138 monthly for total disability, with
additional amounts for specific disabilities-e.g., loss of both arms or legs, total blindness-
to a maximum of $360. A disability rating of 60 percent or more entitles the veteran to
additional payments for dependents, the maximum being $91 per month. Thus the maxi-
mum combination of total disability (with specific crippling features) and dependent
relatives will command a maximum compensation of $451 per month. The great majority
of injured soldiers, of course, are compensated at much lower rates.
25. The kind of discrepancy that may arise is strikingly illustrated by the facts of the
instant case. Welker Brooks, the injured soldier, was awarded a monthly compensation
qf $27.60, for 20 percent disability. When computed over a period of years, these pay-
ments, plus the value of free medical care provided by the Army and the Veterans' Ad-
ministration, are a close approximation to the $4,000 damages awarded by the District
Court. For the death of his brother Arthur, however, the total compensation was a $468
death gratuity (six months pay) to his mother, plus the value of his burial paid for by the
Army. The parents' application for a pension was denied because they failed to prove
dependency upon the deceased son. Thus, even if the $5,000 service life insurance policy-
which Arthur Brooks had paid for himself-is added to the award, the total compensation
for this wrongful death is still far below the $25,000 judgment that the District Court
awarded to the estate. (It should be noted, however, that the size of the tort judgment
will vary considerably among the several states).
While the major inequity thus lies in the area of death actions, even in injury cases
the claimant might prefer the immediate lump-sum recovery rather than small payments
spread out over a period of years. A seemingly equitable solution would be to make both
alternatives available, with the claimant entitled to the larger but not both of the two
possible recoveries. See notes 34 and 35 infra.
24.' 39 STAT. 742 (1916), as amended, 5 U.S.C. §751 et seq. (1946).
25. See notes 33 and 84 infra.
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the Tort Claims Act, and that Congress never intended to exclude service-
men from the coverage of the Act.26
The court's assumption that soldiers' claims were never previously recog-
nized by Congress also seems questionable in view of the provisions and
history of the Military Claims Act of 1943. - This law provided for adminis-
trative settlement by the Var Department of any claims not exceeding
$1,000 for property losses, personal injury, or death caused by military
personnel or civilian employees of the War Department acting within the
scope of their employment, or otherwise incident to noncombat activities
of the Army, provided no contributory negligence was involved. The Act
expressly excluded claims of military personnel and civilian employees
based on death or injury incurred "incident to their service." 2-3 By implica-
tion, it would seem that "non-incident" claims were intended to be allowed.2
26. Representative Celler's statement, delivered orally to the YAUt LAYw JOurt-AL on
November 26, 1948, is as follows:
"The opinion of the Fourth Circuit is utterly erroneous when it says that it vas the
intent of Congress to exclude a member of the Armed Forces from the benefits of the
Tort Claims Act. I am the author of the bill, and I piloted it through the Subcommittee
of the House Judiciary Committee, the House Judiciary Committee, and the House. Prior
to its passage I worked on this bill for many years, and I repeatedly offered it to suc-
cessive Congresses before its final passage. I had more to do with it than any other
member. I never intended to preclude a suit by a soldier. Despite the fact that the latter
might have various and sundry remedies for compensation, pensions, hospitalization,
preferences, etc., these benefits bad nothing whatsoever to do v.ith, and are utterly unre-
lated to the right to sue tinder the Federal Tort Claims Act. The only place where soldiers
were even mentioned was in a section that wvas cut out of the Act. [see note 8 .ltra]. We
start off with the proposition in general that the Government deliberately removes the
defense of sovereignty, except in the cases where the Act specifically makes an exception.
The exception cannot be implied; it must be expressed. The court cannot read the excep-
tions into the law."
Perhaps another factor relevant to the legislative intent is the date on which the Tort
Claims Act was enacted. August 2, 1946, the date of passage, was just befure a Congres-
sional election, and less than a year after the end of the Second World War. In this
context, the realities of politics make it reasonable to assume, in the absence of any
concrete evidence to the contrary, that Congress did not intend to exclude all servicemen
from the coverage of the Act.
27. 57 STAT. 372 (1943), as amended, 31 U.S.C. §223(b) (1946).
28. Ibid. The phrase "incident to their service" has been defined by the Judge Ad-
vocate General's Department to mean . . . vhile engaged in the actual performance of
some official duty." It is less inclusive than the phrases "line of duty" and "scope of em-
ployment" JUDGE ADvOCATE G ENs.k's Sc0aooL, CLA1Us By ,um AGA=IsI Trn Gwmi-
=IENT 30, 31 (text no. 8, 1945).
29. That part of the Military Claims Act which applied to i:cgligently caused injuries,
as distinguished from pure "accidents," was repealed and replaced by part 2 of the Tort
Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 921 (1946), which is phrased in similar language except that the
exclusion of claims of military perzonnel and civilian employees "incident to their serv-
ice," supra note 28, is omitted. No reason for this omission appears in the legislative his-
tory of the Act. It might be construed as evidencing a Congressional intent to abandon the
limitation and thus allow all military claims except those arising out of "combatant activi-
ties," or to allow no military claims at all, or else to reenact by implication the previous
1949]
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This inference is supported by War Department regulations, which require
that claims of military personnel first be considered under the medical at-
tendance and burial expense provisions of Army Regulations, but permit
claims not within the scope of those provisions to be payable under the
Military Claims Act"... on the same basis as are claims of persons not
military personnel. ," 30
Although the court did not touch upon the problem directly, it might be
feared that recognition of soldiers' rights under the Tort Claims Act would
pose a danger of over-compensation. While the veteran is not permitted to
collect more than one award of statutory compensation under the veterans'
laws,31 nothing in the statutes appears to preclude an additional recovery
from the Government as tort-feasor under other laws outside the jurisdic-
tion of the Veterans' Administration. Judicial precedent, however, suggests
two possible solutions. Most cases have held that acceptance of compensa-
tion under one law constituted an "election of remedies" which barred a
recovery from the Government under other statutes, 2 although the mere
limitation. The War Department, in administering this portion of the Act, has chosen the
third alternative by reiterating the "incident to their service" limitation. U.S. WAit Dia,.,
AR 25-70 § 15(1) (1947), thus by implication allowing other claims by military personnel.
If soldiers may obtain administrative settlement of claims for less than $1,000 under
the Tort Claims Act, it would seem illogical to bar similar claims exceeding that sum un-
der the remaining portions of the Act, for Congress presumably would not have made a
distinction as to soldiers between small and large claims without expressly saying so. This
presumption is supported by the fact that the substantive-law provisions of the Act are
expressly made applicable to both the administrative-settlement and judicial-disposition
parts of the Act. It is at least arguable, therefore, that a partial inclusion of soldiers was
intended to be continued when the tort claims portion of the Military Claims Act was
substantially reenacted as a part of the Tort Claims Act; neither statute expresses any
distinction between soldiers and civilians. Concededly, however, Congress' failure to make
explicit reference to the problem, together with a total lack of previous court or Army
decisions, makes uncertain any conclusions based on the face of the statutes alone.
30. U.S. WAR DEPT., AR 25-25 § 13 (1946). In practice, however, those claims which
are seemingly permitted by these regulations are virtually non-existent. Military medical
attendance and disability benefits are available to all personnel injured "in line of duty,"
which since 1944 has included all injuries except those occasioned by willful misconduct,
desertion, absence without official leave, or incurred while under sentence of court mar-
tial or civil court. 58 STAT. 752 (1944), Vet. Reg. No. 10, 1f VIII, 38 U.S.C. p. 4276
(1946). Since the Military Claims Act limits damages to medical, hospital, and burial
expenses actually incurred, 31 U.S.C. § 223(b) (1946), there have been few, if any, in-
stances of soldiers' injury claims which were not covered by free Army treatment and
therefore allovable under the Act.
31. "Not more than one award of pension, compensation, or emergency officers' or
regular retirement pay, shall be made concurrently to any person based on his own serv-
ice.... This paragraph is hereby made applicable to all laws administered by the
Veterans' Administration." Vet. Reg. No. 10, ff XIII, 38 U.S.C. p. 4276 (1946).
32. E.g., Dahn v. Davis, 258 U.S. 421 (1922) (railway mail clerk, injured while
working for United States, was barred from suing Government under Railroad Control
Act of 1918 by his previous election of benefits under the Federal Employees' Compensa-
tion Act) ; Sandoval v. Davis, 288 Fed. 56 (6th Cir. 1923) (soldier, injured by wreck on
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availability of alternate compensation does not bar a tort action elected
by the claimant in lieu of compensation. 3 And a less restricted basis for
recovery is suggested by the recent decision in White v. United States, hold-
ing that civilian employees who had already received benefits under the
Federal Employees' Compensation Act were not thereby barred from suing
the Government under the Tort Claims Act for the same injury, although
their compensation awards would be applied in mitigation of damages in
their tort judgments.34 This more generous approach, which in effect leaves
the claimant with the larger, but not both, of two available benefits, would
seem to offer the best solution to the parallel problem of possible double
recovery by military personnel."
Government operated railroad, barred from bringing tort action under Railroad Control
Act by previous receipt of compensation from the Bureau of War Risk Insurance).
33. Payne v. Cohlmeyer, 275 Fed. 803 (7th Cir. 1921) (action may be brought under
Railroad Control Act of 1918 when potential remedy under Federal Employees' Compn-
sation Act was not claimed) ; United States v. Marine, 155 F.2d 456 (4th Cir. 1946) (ac-
tion may be brought under Suits in Admiralty Act when claimant had not previously
pursued his remedy under the Federal Employees' Compensation Act). See Ku-srouoa
AND GLEN, AammcAx LAW OF VE- rNnas § 717 (1946).
Thus the assertion of the court in the Brooks case that existence of servicemen's bene-
fits barred their right to sue in tort seems to confuse the mere availability of a statutory
benefit with actual acceptance of the benefit.
34. 77 F. Supp. 316 (D.N.J. 1948). This decision, however, is not a clear precedent
for future action because of the special circumstances of the case. Both claimants had
been injured and had received their compensation in 1945, prior to the passage of the
Tort Claims Act. They were subsequently enabled to sue only by virtue of the retroactive
coverage of the Act to January 1, 1945. Thus they could not be said to have "elected"
compensation in preference to their tort claim, since the tort remedy was not then in ex-
istence. The Brooks case, however, is identical to the White case in this respect, since
Welker Brooks was also injured and awarded his disability compensation in 1945, prior
to the passage of the Tort Claims Act.
A similarly generous decision was given in the recent case of United States v. Wade,
170 F.2d 298 (1st Cir. 194), in which plaintiffs had received in 1945 a settlement of their
claim from the War Department under the Military Claims Act, and later brought suit
under the Tort Claims Act for the damages not already compensated by the $1,000 settle-
ment. The court held that the earlier compensation was only partial, not covering such
items as pain and suffering and impairment of earning power, and could not, therefore, ba
held as a "full satisfaction and final settlement" of their subsequently acquired cause of
action under the Tort Claims Act; plaintiffs were therefore granted the remainder of
their damages. Contra: Jordan v. United States, 170 F2d 211 (5th Cir. 1943). It remains
to be seen, however, whether parallel recoveries would be similarly extended to a claim-
ant who in fact has both remedies available from the time of his injury.
35. In cases where the claimant's injury w;as caused by a third party, a similarly gen-
erous result is provided by the Federal Employees' Compensation Act, 39 STAT. 742
(1916), as amended, 5 U.S.C. § 751 et seq. (1946), and the World War Veterans Act of
1924, 43 STAT. 607 (1924), as amended, 38 U.S.C. § 421 ct scq.(1946). Both laws provide
that claimants may be required, as a condition precedent to receiving their statutory com-
pensation, to assign their claims against third party tort-feasors to the Government; any
judgment recovered against the third party would be credited to the claimant's compeusa-
tion, and the surplus, if any, paid to the claimant. 5 U.S.C. §§ 776, 777 (1945) ; 33 U.S.C.
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Apparently underlying the court's decision was the notion, largely un-
articulated, that the "special and unique" nature of the Government-
soldier relationship itself should bar the soldier's action under the Tort
Claims Act. The court seems to have been thinking primarily in terms of
the special protection accorded soldiers by the Government in the form of
disability compensation and other benefits. But the difference in the aims
and application of compensation and the Tort Claims Act remedy, 5 and
particularly the inadequacy of compensation in wrongful death cases,8"
cast doubt on the conclusiveness of this factor. Nor does the general nature
of the military relationship provide any decisive answer. 3 To be sure, the
soldier is subject at all times to military law and discipline; 89 and, unlike
other employees, he is without power to terminate his status at will. On
the other hand, the soldier is still a citizen; for the most part, his military
status does not relieve him of his rights and duties under the civil and crim-
inal law of the community. 4 He still may sue and be sued as a private per-
son.4 1 Moreover, as the Armed Forces take on more and more the charac-
teristics of a citizens' army, fed by an unprecedented peacetime draft and
maintained at substantial size, there seems to be less reason than ever for
treating the soldier as different from the civilian, except in the peculiarly
military aspects of his life.
§ 502 (1946). Thus the claimant would in effect receive the larger of two possible
recoveries, whether compensation or tort judgment, with the other deducted from the
combined total. The current veterans laws, however, contain no such provision.
36. In addition to the differences between workmen's compensation and tort recov-
eries, several factors distinguish veterans' benefits from the usual compensation award.
Benefits are awarded, for example, not only for accidents but also for illness contracted
in service, without any regard to its relation to employment. Moreover, veterans' compen-
sation is rigidly geared to the concept of permanent disability. There is no compensation
at all for such injuries as a broken arm or fractured skull if the injury is not permanent,
except for the free medical care provided by the Government.
37. See note 23 supra.
38. Apart from its discussion of servicemen's benefits, and a brief observation that
soldiers are subject to military discipline, United States v. Brooks, 169 F.2d 840, 842 (4th
Cir. 1948), the court merely cited from two old cases dealing with breach of the "contract"
of enlistment, In re Grimley, 137 U.S. 147, 152. (1890), and In re Morrissey, 137 U.S. 157,
159 (1890), and the more recent decision in United States v. Standard Oil Co. of Califor-
nia, 332 U.S. 301, 305 (1947). None of these cases provides much relevant discussion of
the Government-soldier relationship, except for the cryptic comment in the Standard Oil
opinion that the relationship is "distinctively federal." Id. at 305.
39. See McCoMsEY AND EDWARDS, THE SOLDIER AND THE LAW (1941) and GmIZN,
THE ARMY AND THE LAW (Schiller ed. 1943).
40. 'See ANDERSON, LEaAL STATUS OF SOLDIERS AND SAILORS UNDER CIVIL RELIEF
AcTs (1941). See also c. 8 of GLENN, op. cit. supra note 39.
41. See Note, 135 A.L.R. 10 (1941) for a review of authority on this subject. Civil
liability of servicemen is, of course, subject to the qualifications of such laws as the
Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act, 54 STAT. 1178 (1940), as amended, 50 U.S.C. § 501
et seq. (App. 1946), which protect them from any loss or hardship suffered on account




Is the answer to be found in the fact that the soldier's claim is against the
Government rather than against a private party? The court warned that
recognition of the soldier's right to sue would lead to extensive litigation by
servicemen on all sorts of claims, resulting in the "devastation of military
discipline and morale." 42 This fear might conceivably be justified if the
soldier's action were against the individual officer or fellow-soldier responsi-
ble for his injury; but imposition of liability upon the Government seems
too remote from the individual relationships to cause any substantial sub-
version of discipline or morale.43 Moreover, possible disciplinary problems
would seem to be considerably reduced by the fact that most injuries which
are serious enough to engender an action in tort are also sufficient grounds
for medical disharge from the service. Allowance of soldiers' tort claims
will, to be sure, impose a somewhat increased burden upon the Governmental
agencies which must handle them; 41 but this task is essentially similar to
the job currently performed by the Judge Advocate General's Department
in processing claims of both soldiers and civilians under the Military Claims
and Tort Claims Acts.4" Investigatory techniques and procedure developed
there can easily be utilized to minimize the additional burden of military
claims in court.
There are, of course, good reasons for the Tort Claims Act's exclusion of
claims by soldiers and civilians alike for injuries arising out of wartime
combat.46 By the very nature of war, the Armed Forces cannot be held to
42. United States v. Brooks, 169 F2d 840, 845 (1948). On the other band, Chief
Judge Parker argued in dissent that less harm would result from allowing a soldier to
sue, at least on certain types of claims, than from denying him that right which civilians
now possess. Id. at 850.
43. Military morale might conceivably be affected by such factors as the bad feeling
which could be engendered by adverse testimony of a fellow soldier at the trial of a tort
action, or the possible disrespect of the litigant toward the officer whose negligence forms
the grounds for the action; but such consequences would hardly be so disastrous or nu-
merous as to warrant a prohibition of all military tort claims.
44. It is impossible to estimate how many soldiers' claims may subsequently Lz brought
if the instant case be allowed. A few are currently pending in the courts; see note 5 .supra.
The one year statute of limitations imposed by the Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 942
(1946), would, of course, eliminate all claims incurred more than a year ago and not yet
brought to court. Future claims may, subject to the laws of several states, be consider-
ably limited by the Government's use of the common law defenses of contributory negli-
gence, assumption of risk, and the fellow servant doctrine. Moreover, United States At-
torneys might prevent needless litigation by exercising their power to settle or compromise
valid claims, 28 U.S.C. § 934 (1946). Finally, the volume of potential litigation should
be limited by the likelihood that many injured soldiers will find little advantage in re-
sorting to court action, with its attendant costs and attorneys' fees, to supplement their
already generous benefits under the various compensation laws. This would be much less
likely, however, in cases of wrongful death; see note 23 supra.
45. This procedure is governed by the provisions of U.S.A.n Ds,'r., AR 2_5-20, AR
25-25, and AR 25-70. A detailed description of its operation is given in Junky- AnvacAva
GENERmL's ScHooL, CaTSNs BY AND AGoA.xNST THE GovINENr (text no. 8, 1945).
46. 28 U.S.C. § 943(j) (1946) ; see note 9 supra.
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any ordinary standards of "due care" toward their own personnel or civilians
in the prosecution of war and its incident activities.17 Moreover, the soldier
necessarily must bear certain risks and hardships in military service 5 But
these considerations are inapplicable to the case at the other extreme, where
the soldier is injured by a non-combat military vehicle while he is on fur-
lough and engaged in his own private business. Such an injury is not one
which could have been incurred only by a soldier, nor did it arise from the
fact of his being a soldier."
If some military claims are to be allowed, the remaining problem is to
draw the line in the amorphous area between these two extremes: when and
where should the Government be held liable in tort for violation of a duty
of "due care" toward its military personnel? The Tort Claiis Act, from its
expressed provisions alone, apparently draws the line at actual combat in
time of war, 0 a relatively flexible criterion which the courts can shape as
cases arise."' The Act might also be construed as incorporating the Military
47. "In practice or training remote from combat, there would be the same opportunity
for care and caution as in peace time; whereas, in actual fighting, the attention and en-
ergies of the military personnel would be directed and devoted to the destruction of the
enemy and its property, as well as to the protection of the lives of their own forces, citizens
and property by the use of force immediately applied ... " Skeels v. United States, 72
F.Supp. 372, 374 (W.D. La. 1947).
48. The familiar tort doctrine of voluntary assumption of risk seems largely inap-
plicable here, for only the so-called "professional" soldier could be said to have assumed
voluntarily all the risks of Army service. Yet every citizen or resident bears a constitu-
tional obligation to serve in the Armed Forces when the need arises, and the risks and
hazards of war are a necessary concomitant of the duty to bear arms. In certain eases,
therefore, military service must be placed above and beyond the safeguards of ordinary
tort law.
As to both the conscripted soldier and the voluntarily enlisted "professional," the
risks and the fundamental duty are the same; it seems unlikely that courts would distin-
guish between them in terms of the risks they must face without protection of tort doc-
trine.
49. Even if "assumption of risk" were argued as a basis for denying recovery-see
note 48 supra-it certainly would not apply to the extreme "non-service-caused" injuries
in the Brooks case.
50. 28 U.S.C. § 943(j) (1946) ; see note 9 supra.
51. The first case to involve any interpretation of the "combatant activities" excep-
tion was Skeels v. United States, 72 F.Supp. 372 (W.D. La. 1947), in which a civilian
plaintiff sued for injuries caused by a piece of machinery which fell upon him from an
Army plane engaged in target practice over the Gulf of Mexico during 1945. The court
held that "combatant activity" meant only actual wartime combat against the enemy, and
that target practice remote from the scene of actual combat, even in wartime, was not
within the exception to the coverage of the Tort Claims Act. Accord: Johnson v. United
States, 170 F.2d 767 (9th Cir. 1948). But cf. Perucki v. United States, 80 F.Supp. 959
(M.D.Pa. 1948) (veteran's action for negligence of Veterans Administration doctor in
reexamining an old war injury in late 1946 to determine proper compensation rate, held
barred by "combatant activities" exception of Tort Claims Act).
If "combatant activities" is to be the criterion of non-permissible military claims,
however, a broader definition may be desirable. The "time of war" requirement seems too
strict, for it would seem reasonable to include war games, target practice, bayonet prac-
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Claims Act's exclusion of recovery for injuries "incident to service" -
again a matter for judicial interpretation.
If the "time of war" limitation is deemed too strict,5 3 or if the courts fail
to develop a practicable solution, legislative revision may be necessary.
Perhaps the "incident to service" limitation should be expressly incorporated
into the Act. Or the revision might borrow from the recent British waiver
of sovereign immunity in the Crown Proceedings Act of 1947,11 which bars
military personnel from suing their government for injuries caused by fellow
servicemen only when the injured man was "on duty," or when the injury
or death occurred on military premises, or on a ship, aircraft, or vehicle used
for military purposes.15 The use of this sort of criterion, supplementing the
"combatant activities" exception already stated by the Tort Claims Act,
should be strict enough to forestall the "floods of litigation" feared by the
court." At the same time, it would remove the inequity of denying a tort
recovery to the soldier whose injury or death is completely unrelated to his
military status.
tice, and similar necessary preparation for actual combat within the meaning of the e.cep-
tion. Depending upon the particular facts involved, the same activity might be "combatant"
-with respect to military participants and "non-combatant" with respect to civilians who
are accidentally injured thereby.
52. See notes 28 and 29 supra.
53. See note 51 .supra.
54. 10 & 11 Gao. VI, c. 44 (1947), 6 HAxsBuRay's STATs. or ENG.I 46 (2d ed.
1948). See generally, J.R.B. Srra, THE CRowN PRocM IrNGs AcT (1948); Barnes,
The Crown Proceedings Act, 1947, 26 CAN. B. REv. 387 (1948).
55. The Act provides that in all cases the Minister of Pensions must certify that the
injury was or was not incurred "on duty"-4.e., attributable to military service for pur-
poses of eligibility for disability or death compensation. 6 HA.s uuy's STArs. or Ez.G-
LAND 55 (2d ed. 1948). If incurred "on duty," and therefore eligible for compensation,
the injury may not be sued upon under the Act; compensation and tort claims are thus
mutually exclusive. The British criterion of "on duty," however, seems to be considerably
narrower than the "line of duty" test employed by the United States Veterans' Adminis-
tration for purposes of compensation eligibility; see note 30 supra. The American soldier
injured on furlough is eligible for all benefits, With certain limited exceptions where his
injury is attributable to willful misconduct, absence Without leave, or desertion, vhile his
British counterpart injured in similar circumstances is not eligible.
56. The "floods of litigation' argument vas raised in a more generalized context by
Representatives Hancock and Taber in an attempt to defeat the passage of the Tort
Claims Act entirely. S6 CoNG. Rac. 12023, 12025 (1940). Dean Green points out that this
objection has been urged since time immemorial by judges and legislators who feared the
consequences of ackmowledging new rights and remedies which society had come to con-
sider essential. Green, The Duty Problem, 28 COL. L. Ray. 1014 (1928).
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